How Football ChangedFourth down and beyond
Nineteen Flat Years, Then the Fourth-Down Boom
For 19 seasons, NFL coaches went for it on 4th-and-short about one time in four. Then, starting in 2018, the rate more than doubled. Conversion rates did not budge, and going kept beating kicking.
By Edgehalla ResearchPublished 7 min read
More takeaways below
- Aggressive teams did not reliably beat the spread the next year. Teams ranked 2017–24, graded on 2018–25: 52.2% covers (95% range 48.7–55.7%). That is noise, not an edge.
- Dan Campbell's Lions led the boom era: 8.2 more go calls per 100 fourth downs than an average team in the same spots.
On this page
One in four, then nearly two in three
For 19 seasons, NFL coaches went for it on 4th-and-1 or 4th-and-2 about one time in four. In 2025 they went 61.9% of the time. The change did not creep in. It arrived in 2018.
How often NFL teams go for it on 4th-and-1 or 4th-and-2
Regular season, 1999–2025. Share of 4th-and-1/2 snaps that were a run or pass rather than a punt or field goal.
Show data
| Year | Competitive | Every snap |
|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 23.9% | 30.2% |
| 2000 | 22.9% | 28.5% |
| 2001 | 25.8% | 29.5% |
| 2002 | 25.2% | 30.8% |
| 2003 | 27.6% | 31.6% |
| 2004 | 23.3% | 29.2% |
| 2005 | 26.7% | 32.6% |
| 2006 | 25.2% | 28.9% |
| 2007 | 32.2% | 35.4% |
| 2008 | 31.2% | 35.7% |
| 2009 | 31.2% | 37.3% |
| 2010 | 27.2% | 34.5% |
| 2011 | 20.4% | 27.4% |
| 2012 | 22.8% | 28.2% |
| 2013 | 27.4% | 30.9% |
| 2014 | 25.2% | 30.0% |
| 2015 | 25.8% | 31.5% |
| 2016 | 29.6% | 34.0% |
| 2017 | 29.7% | 32.5% |
| 2018 | 40.5% | 44.2% |
| 2019 | 46.0% | 48.3% |
| 2020 | 54.0% | 54.4% |
| 2021 | 57.7% | 57.9% |
| 2022 | 48.6% | 51.6% |
| 2023 | 53.6% | 55.5% |
| 2024 | 58.7% | 59.1% |
| 2025 | 61.9% | 63.9% |
- Nineteen flat years: 1999 to 2017
- 2018: 2018: 40.5%
The 2017 rate was 29.7%. One year later it was 40.5%, the first season more than five points above every earlier year. It climbed again to 54.0% in 2020 and has not fallen below 48.6% since.
A short-yardage revolution
Go rate by yards to go
Competitive situations only. Each panel shares the same 0–80% scale.
4th-and-175.1%
4th-and-239.1%
4th-and-3-519.0%
4th-and-6 or more1.2%
Show data
| Year | 4th-and-1 | 4th-and-2 | 4th-and-3-5 | 4th-and-6 or more |
|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1999 | 32.4% | 9.5% | 5.2% | 1.7% |
| 2000 | 33.4% | 8.1% | 4.7% | 2.2% |
| 2001 | 37.0% | 9.3% | 5.2% | 1.6% |
| 2002 | 34.5% | 12.8% | 5.6% | 2.1% |
| 2003 | 38.2% | 14.7% | 4.6% | 1.7% |
| 2004 | 32.1% | 10.2% | 5.0% | 1.4% |
| 2005 | 37.6% | 11.2% | 3.9% | 1.0% |
| 2006 | 36.3% | 8.8% | 4.1% | 1.6% |
| 2007 | 43.6% | 15.2% | 6.2% | 2.4% |
| 2008 | 44.4% | 12.1% | 5.4% | 1.3% |
| 2009 | 43.8% | 9.1% | 5.0% | 1.3% |
| 2010 | 39.0% | 11.0% | 4.9% | 1.4% |
| 2011 | 29.4% | 9.7% | 5.0% | 1.0% |
| 2012 | 31.9% | 8.1% | 3.6% | 1.2% |
| 2013 | 38.6% | 10.3% | 4.7% | 1.1% |
| 2014 | 38.0% | 7.5% | 6.2% | 1.1% |
| 2015 | 39.2% | 9.9% | 5.3% | 0.9% |
| 2016 | 38.5% | 15.9% | 5.7% | 1.3% |
| 2017 | 41.9% | 13.6% | 4.3% | 2.1% |
| 2018 | 54.4% | 18.3% | 8.1% | 0.9% |
| 2019 | 57.3% | 29.2% | 9.5% | 2.2% |
| 2020 | 66.8% | 34.5% | 10.1% | 1.8% |
| 2021 | 72.4% | 36.2% | 12.4% | 2.4% |
| 2022 | 61.5% | 29.5% | 12.8% | 2.0% |
| 2023 | 66.6% | 33.3% | 13.0% | 1.8% |
| 2024 | 70.1% | 39.6% | 15.4% | 1.7% |
| 2025 | 75.1% | 39.1% | 19.0% | 1.2% |
On 4th-and-1, teams now go 75.1% of the time, against a pre-2018 high of 44.4%. On 4th-and-2 it nearly tripled from 2017, from 13.6% to 39.1%. Even 4th-and-3 to 5 reached 19.0% in 2025.
Long yardage did not change at all. On 4th-and-6 or more, teams went 1.2% of the time in 2025, inside the range of the previous 26 seasons. Across all fourth downs the go rate rose from 6.3% in 1999 to 17.2%.
Where on the field coaches got braver
Go rate on 4th-and-1/2 by field position, then and now
Competitive situations. 2005-09 vs 2021-25.
Coaches go more from every part of the field; the biggest jumps are in the red zone (38.8% to 75.5%) and midfield (51.2% to 85.6%). Own-half attempts nearly quadrupled, from 7.9% to 30.1%.
- 2005-09
- 2021-25
Between midfield and the opponent's 35, teams now go for it on 85.6% of short fourth downs, against 51.2% in 2005-09. That is the zone where a punt gains little and a field goal is long.
The red zone flipped too. Inside the 20, the go rate nearly doubled, from 38.8% to 75.5%. Coaches now take a touchdown chance over a near-certain three points most of the time.
More attempts, same success rate
Conversion rate when teams go on 4th-and-1/2
First down or touchdown, by play or penalty. Competitive situations.
Show data
| Year | Converted |
|---|---|
| 1999 | 65.6% |
| 2000 | 67.2% |
| 2001 | 58.0% |
| 2002 | 64.9% |
| 2003 | 65.2% |
| 2004 | 63.0% |
| 2005 | 63.3% |
| 2006 | 68.7% |
| 2007 | 62.9% |
| 2008 | 73.0% |
| 2009 | 63.5% |
| 2010 | 63.2% |
| 2011 | 55.4% |
| 2012 | 70.1% |
| 2013 | 61.7% |
| 2014 | 68.0% |
| 2015 | 65.9% |
| 2016 | 63.3% |
| 2017 | 66.2% |
| 2018 | 71.9% |
| 2019 | 61.0% |
| 2020 | 64.0% |
| 2021 | 66.5% |
| 2022 | 60.1% |
| 2023 | 66.1% |
| 2024 | 66.1% |
| 2025 | 66.8% |
- 2018: Boom begins
- Reference: 1999–2017 average 64.7% (64.7%)
If coaches were now going on worse chances, conversion rates should have dropped. They did not. Teams converted 64.7% of 4th-and-1/2 attempts from 1999 to 2017 (n = 2,618) and 65.3% from 2018 to 2025 (n = 2,144).
That is consistent with the old coaches leaving good chances on the table, not with the new ones finding extra ones.
Did going for it pay?
Going for it vs kicking on 4th-and-1/2: expected points gained
Average EPA of go attempts minus punts and field goals from the same distance and 10-yard field band.
EPA
Show data
| Year | Go minus kick |
|---|---|
| 1999 | 1.11 EPA |
| 2000 | 1.06 EPA |
| 2001 | 0.19 EPA |
| 2002 | 0.95 EPA |
| 2003 | 0.76 EPA |
| 2004 | 0.60 EPA |
| 2005 | 0.48 EPA |
| 2006 | 1.37 EPA |
| 2007 | 0.84 EPA |
| 2008 | 1.17 EPA |
| 2009 | 0.73 EPA |
| 2010 | 0.58 EPA |
| 2011 | −0.22 EPA |
| 2012 | 0.78 EPA |
| 2013 | 0.38 EPA |
| 2014 | 0.73 EPA |
| 2015 | 0.65 EPA |
| 2016 | 0.53 EPA |
| 2017 | 0.56 EPA |
| 2018 | 0.63 EPA |
| 2019 | 0.34 EPA |
| 2020 | 0.47 EPA |
| 2021 | 0.56 EPA |
| 2022 | 0.18 EPA |
| 2023 | 0.75 EPA |
| 2024 | 0.38 EPA |
| 2025 | 1.10 EPA |
- Reference: No difference (0.00 EPA)
On the snap itself, going beat kicking in every season but 2011. Before the boom the gap was 0.66 expected points per decision; since 2018 it is 0.57. In win probability, going added about 3.5 percentage points of win probability per attempt.
The gap barely shrank as attempts doubled, which fits a decision that was under-used, though teams still choose when to go.
The coaches who went first
| Period | Coach | Seasons | Extra goes per 100 | Go rate (all 4th downs) | Fourth downs |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Since 2018 | Dan Campbell | 2021-2025 | +8.2 | 27.0% | 397 |
| Since 2018 | Kliff Kingsbury | 2019-2022 | +5.8 | 20.2% | 342 |
| Since 2018 | Pat Shurmur | 2018-2019 | +5.4 | 14.3% | 175 |
| Since 2018 | Nick Sirianni | 2021-2025 | +4.7 | 19.1% | 408 |
| Since 2018 | Brandon Staley | 2021-2023 | +4.1 | 20.6% | 243 |
| Since 2018 | Matt LaFleur | 2019-2025 | +4.0 | 18.5% | 520 |
| 1999–2017 | Dick LeBeau | 2000-2002 | +4.3 | 10.4% | 259 |
| 1999–2017 | Jim Haslett | 2000-2008 | +3.9 | 9.8% | 613 |
| 1999–2017 | Doug Pederson | 2016-2017 | +3.6 | 14.8% | 189 |
| 1999–2017 | Vince Tobin | 1999-2000 | +3.3 | 8.4% | 154 |
Dan Campbell's Lions top the boom era: 8.2 extra go calls per 100 fourth downs from 2021-2025. The most aggressive single season was the 2021 Chargers under Brandon Staley, at 13.7 extra per 100.
Before the boom, Doug Pederson's Eagles were already near the top in 2016-2017, at 3.6 extra per 100. Most early adopters, such as LeBeau (10.4%) and Haslett (9.8%), went less often than an average team does now (15.3% of fourth downs in 2021–25).
Did the aggressive teams win more?
Did aggressive teams beat the spread the next season?
Teams in the top or bottom fifth of go-over-expected in season N, graded against the point spread in season N+1.
No: the most aggressive fifth covered 50.6% and 52.2% of games in the two periods, close to the 52.4% needed to profit at standard odds and well within noise.
Not in any way we could measure. Before 2018, across 605 team-seasons, there was a small negative link to win percentage (r = -0.16). That is likely because weaker and trailing teams go for it more. Since 2018 there is none (r = 0.01).
Show the work
- Tests written down
- Not in advance (exploratory)
- Results computed
Every regular-season fourth down from 1999 to 2025 that ended in a run, pass, punt or field goal: 102,661 snaps, 73,994 in competitive situations, 6,653 go attempts. Team tests use 861 team-seasons and nflverse point spreads; the next-season test is out of sample by construction.
| Test | Result | Verdict |
|---|---|---|
| Count every 4th-and-1/2 snap (no situation filter) | 30.2% (1999), 44.2% (2018), 63.9% (2025) | Same shape |
| Drop fake punts and fake field goals | 2025: 61.7% vs 61.9% | No change |
| Conversion rate fell as attempts rose | 64.7% → 65.3% | No |
| Go beats kick on EPA within distance x field cells | +0.66 (1999–2017, n=2613), +0.57 (2018–25, n=2143) | Yes, selection caveat |
| Team go-over-expected vs win % (same season) | r = -0.10 (1999–2017 -0.16, 2018–25 0.01) | Small negative before 2018, none since |
| Team go-over-expected vs wins above spread (same season) | r = -0.12; shuffled 95th percentile |r| = 0.07 | Negative, confounded by trailing |
| Top-fifth aggressive teams cover next season | 50.6% (n=1691); 52.2% (n=787) | Noise around 52.4% break-even |
Frequently asked questions
How often do NFL teams go for it on fourth down now?
In 2025, teams went for it on 61.9% of competitive 4th-and-1 or 4th-and-2 snaps, 75.1% of 4th-and-1 snaps and 17.2% of all fourth downs. Counting every snap, including desperation, the 4th-and-1/2 rate was 63.9%.
When did NFL teams start going for it more?
In 2018. The 4th-and-1/2 go rate had stayed between 20.4% and 32.2% since 1999, then rose to 40.5% in 2018 and 54.0% in 2020.
Has the fourth-down conversion rate dropped?
No. Teams converted 64.7% of 4th-and-1/2 attempts from 1999 to 2017 and 65.3% from 2018 to 2025.
Which coach goes for it most on fourth down?
Among coaches with at least 150 competitive fourth downs since 2018, Dan Campbell, with 8.2 more go calls per 100 fourth downs than an average team in the same spots.
Do fake punts count as going for it?
Yes, a fake punt or fake field goal is an attempt to gain the line. There were 543 in our sample; leaving them out moves the 2025 rate from 61.9% to 61.7%.
More in Fourth down and beyond
Sources and method
- nflverse play-by-play, rosters, combine and schedules (CC-BY 4.0)
- nflverse games file (scores, spreads, roof)
Research and analysis, not betting advice. Past results do not guarantee future returns; bet only what you can afford to lose.